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Negotiation and Native Title: Why
Common Law Courts Are Not Proper
Fora for Determining Native Land
Title Issues
ABSTRACT

The displacement of indigenous populations is an
obvious but often-overlooked consequence of worldwide
European colonization. Until relatively recently, the rights of
these groups have consistently been held to lower standards
of protection than those of their colonizing counterparts,
partly through the use of doctrines such as terra nullius.
While earlier decades established the groundwork for
recognition of these rights, in the 1990s native rights issues
became of greater importance to both the international
community and individual nations. Some of this heightened
interest can be attributed to a series of high-profile common
law court cases that provided native populations with
favorable precedents to rely on for the first time in postcolonization history. The cases of Mabo v. Queensland in
1992, and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia in 1997,
opened the floodgates in Australia and Canada,respectively,
for indigenouspopulationsto litigate claims to land titles that
had been assumed settledfor centuries.
This Note argues that, given the recent volatility of
common law court decisions in the area of native title, these
common law courts are not the proper fora for resolving
centuries-olddisputes between nativepopulations and settler
societies. Rather, a series of negotiations seems much more
appropriatedue to the complexity of the issues and differing
worldviews of the parties involved. First, this Note will use
the words of Canadian and Australian scholars and
indigenous leaders to emphasize the importance of native
title issues to indigenous populations. Next, this Note will
focus on the two landmark cases of Mabo and Delgamuukw
to emphasize the level of complexity involved in resolving
such issues and the importance of resolving those issues
through a flexible, non-adversarialprocess. Finally, this Note
will examine both the legal and extralegal features of
common law court systems that create inherent constraints
on their ability to deal with the problems raised by issues of
native rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To understand our law, our culture and our relationship to the
physical and spiritual world, you must begin with the land.
Everything about Aboriginal society is inextricably interwoven with,
and connected to, the land. Culture is the land, the land and
spirituality of Aboriginal people, our cultural beliefs or reason for
existence is the land. You take that away and you take away our
reason for existence. We have grown the land up. We are dancing,
singing and painting for the land. We are celebrating the land.
1
Removed from our lands, we are literally removed from ourselves.

Aboriginal 2 struggles for land rights and self-government are
hardly new concepts. In many "settled" New World nations,

1.

Michael Dodson, Land Rights and Social Justice, in OUR LAND IS OUR

LIFE: LAND RIGHTS-PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 39, 41 (Galarrwuy Yunupingu ed.,

1997) [hereinafterOUR LAND IS OUR LIFE].
2.
The term 'Aborigine" or "Aboriginal" will be used synonymously with
"indigenous populations" and "native populations" to refer to all Aboriginal
societies, particularly those in Canada and Australia.
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natives' rights have been at issue for hundreds of years.3
However, it is only recently that these rights have become a
matter of both national struggle and public international debate.
The 1990s have seen sweeping changes in the area of native land
rights, and not all of them have been for the better. 4 These
changes have occurred through a variety of means, including the
legislative process, negotiated settlements, and the court system.
The purposes of this Note are both to explain why the
common law court system is an inadequate forum for determining
native rights issues and to emphasize negotiation, of which
legislation plays an inevitable role, as the proper alternative to
litigation. This Note will focus on the issue of native title to land
to provide the framework for these arguments. Part II of the Note
will discuss reasons why land rights issues are of such
importance to Aboriginal societies.
Parts III and IV will discuss Australian and Canadian
treatment of native title issues and native rights in general. An
examination of these two countries are important for a variety of
reasons, including their similarities as common law countries,
their significant ties to the same colonial ruler (England), and the
prominence of each country's native rights movement.
Additionally, for reasons that will be discussed in more detail in
this Note, the current political and legal state in each country
easily lend themselves to a direct analysis of the benefits of
negotiation over litigation in this area.
Finally, Part V addresses specific factors favoring negotiation
over litigation in the native rights context, drawing on specific
examples from both Australia and Canada. These factors are
split into legal and extralegal justifications, even though there is
much overlap between the two areas. The current political
climates in Australia and Canada make these nations prime
candidates to consider the arguments set forth in this Note.

3.
The United States is certainly no stranger to the debate, as such early
cases as Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), illustrate. In the first
major native rights case, Justice John Marshall and the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a group of speculators claim of title because they had bought the land
directly from the Indians involved. The Court reasoned that the Indians could sell
or cede their land only to the U.S. government. See id. at 587-89.
4.
See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the
Australia Native Title Amendment Act 1998 and Australia's recent shift away from
granting land rights to a potentially more restrictive approach).
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II. WHY LAND RIGHTS?
The basic assumption underlying the argument that native
land rights claims need to be negotiated rather than litigated is
that land rights are of great importance to indigenous
populations. As the opening quotation to this Note emphasizes,
many indigenous populations have a unique connection with
their native lands. This connection almost invariably involves not
just a physical element but strong spiritual and cultural ties as
well. 5
In an oft-cited passage, Professor W.E.H. Stanner
compared European and Aboriginal conceptions of land as
follows:
No English words are good enough to give a sense of the links
between an Aboriginal group and its homeland. Our word 'home',
warm and suggestive though it be, does not match the Aboriginal

word that may mean 'camp', 'hearth', 'country', 'everlasting home',
'totem place', 'ife source', 'spirit centre' and much else all in one.
Our word land' is too spare and meagre.... The Aboriginal would
speak of 'earth' and used the word in a richly symbolic way to mean
his 'shoulder' or his 'side'. I have seen an Aboriginal embrace the
6
earth he walked on.

Aboriginal activist Galarrwuy Yunupingu also expressed the
Aboriginal spiritual connection with the land in almost purely
physical terms:
"Getting the land back has been important
because the land is part of us, we are one because of our
relationship.
There is nothing-no law, no person-that will
separate our connection with land. Getting the land back has
7
kept our spirits alive."
As a corollary to the fundamental connection many
indigenous populations feel toward their native lands,
establishing land rights is an important step toward achieving the
ability of self-determination and self-government. Even if self-

5.
In this regard, Dodson wrote, "Land rights is a social justice issue
because the result of not having access to your land is the destruction of culture,
language and spirituality." Dodson, supra note 1, at 42.
6.
W.E.H. STANNER, WHITE MAN GOT No DREAMING: ESSAYS 1938-1973, 230
(1979). See also Stephen Aronson, Aboriginal Land Rights, in ABORIGINAL ISSUES
TODAY: A LEGAL AND BUSINESS GUIDE 32, 32-33 (Stephen B. Smart & Michael Coyle
eds., 1997) ("Aboriginal land rights are not comparable to concepts of Canadian
property and real estate law. Part of the uniqueness flows from the spiritual and
cultural relationship that Aboriginal peoples have with the land. .. ").
7.
Galarrwuy Yunupingu, From the Bark Petition to Native Title, in OUR
LAND ISOUR LIFE, supranote 1, at 1, 11.
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government is not the ultimate goal,8 the rights to exclude others
and to determine the most economical use of land, both integral
parts of self-determination, are important facets of many
indigenous populations' agendas. As longtime Aboriginal activist
Lois ODonoghue wrote, "In so many different contexts, control of
land is both the reality and symbolism of self-determination.
Land ownership and management are not just the keys to our9
cultural futures, but the keys to our economic emancipation."
The concern among many Aboriginal leaders is that any efforts
toward self-determination will be undermined by a curtailment or
removal of these land rights.1 0
ODonoghue's view that land rights are essential to "economic
emancipation" indicates that economic factors also play a role in
justifying the importance of land rights to indigenous
populations. 11 The role that economics takes is twofold. Both
the potential positive effects to indigenous people and the
negative economic impact current land rights policy entails must
be considered.
Gaining and maintaining control of land provides indigenous
populations with the economic base necessary to compete in the
marketplace.' 2 While all native people wish to recover lost lands
because of the cultural and spiritual value they hold, many also
recognize the practical economic interests inherent in the land.
Mining, grazing, and timber operations represent big business on
most Canadian and Australian native lands. If natives regained
title to these lands, they alone would have the right to allow
access to industrial and agricultural corporations.' 3 Natives also

8.
See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing the new
Canadian province of Nunavut as a potential example of workable selfgovernment).
9.
Lois O'Donoghue, Something to Celebrate, in OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE,
supra note 1, at 28, 29.
10.
See Tracker Tilmouth, Taking Stock of Land Rights, in OUR LAND IS OUR
LIFE, supra note 1, at 18, 24 ("Land rights are the foundation-but at the end of
the 20th century it is time to take the next step to develop Aboriginal
communities. We must take that step without continually having to expend
precious energy having to defend land rights.").
11.
O'Donoghue, supra note 9, at 24.
GROUP
ON
NATIVE
TITLE,
12.
See NATIONAL
INDIGENOUS
WORKING
COEXISTENCE-NEGOTIATION AND CERTAINTY: INDIGENOUS POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THE
WIK DECISION AND THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIVE TITLE

ACT, 1993 (1997) (-Native Title provides the way forward for Indigenous economic
and social development and participation on a full and equal basis in the life of
the nation.") [hereinafter NATIONAL INDIGENOUS WORKING GROUP ON NATIVE TITLE].

13.
However, when Australia drafted national legislation on native land
rights, the Federal Government stopped short of allowing Aborigines veto power
over all future mining proposals on their lands. See FRANK BRENNAN, ONE LAND,
ONE NATION: MABo-TOwARDS 2001, at 53 (1995).
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possess sufficient knowledge of the market to be able to place a
value on these business opportunities to those who would exploit
them. As one commentator notes, "The ability for Aboriginal
people to control access to, and use of, their country is the single
most important factor in allowing them to negotiate effectively
14
with the mining industry."
Additionally, because of their unique connection to the land
as a spiritual and cultural center, denial of rights to that land
creates an adverse economic effect on indigenous and European
populations alike. Once native peoples are removed from their
spiritual and cultural center, they tend to gravitate to urban
areas "in an increased state of social dislocation and spiritual
desolation." l5 The resulting economic and political effect on
16
public welfare is "beyond quantification."
Finally, the entire native rights movement is based in part on
the need for reparation of hundreds of years of moral wrongs. 17
European society relocated or decimated millions of native people,
and the first step in doing so inevitably involved taking their
native lands. The effects of these takings are still felt today, not
only by dispossessed Aborigines, but also by the European
societies that must support them through public welfare.' s
Returning at least part of those lands is therefore the necessary
first step toward some measure of absolution. 19

14.
Yunupingu, supranote 7, at 9.
15.
Tilmouth, supra note 10, at 23.
16.
Id.
17.
See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the incompatibility of morality and the
common law court system in terms of dealing with native land rights issues).
18.
In Australia, the situation is sobering. As stated by Dodson:
We are still the ones who are 18 times more likely to be in prisons;
they still inadequately house 60 percent of us; we are still the ones dying
18 to 20 years younger than other Australians; still the ones only one-third
as likely to complete secondary school, three times as likely to be
unemployed, and 60 percent of us are unemployed.
Dodson, supranote 1, at 40.
19.
See Peter Yu, Multilateral Agreements-A New Accountability in
Aboriginal Affairs, in OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE, supra note 1, at 168, 179 ("Recognition
of our native title rights offers government the opportunity to overcome its
disgraceful and undignified behaviour towards Aboriginal people.").
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III. AUSTRALIA
A. History ofTerra Nullius
The Aboriginal2" struggle for land rights in Australia has
been defined by the common law doctrine of terranullius. This is
usually interpreted to mean "unoccupied land,"2 1 or "no-man's
land."2 2 During the period of European colonization, three basic
methods of acquiring colonial land were recognized-(1)
persuading native populations to submit to the colonizer's rule,
(2) purchasing some or all of the land from native populations, or
23
(3) discovering and possessing "unoccupied" land first.
When Captain Cook landed on the east coast of Australia in
1770, he disregarded the fact that the land was already occupied
and chose the third option in declaring the land under British
rule.2 4 Cook apparently regarded the few Aborigines he
encountered along the coast as insufficient in number to require
either of the other two options.2 S Furthermore, he felt the
"Aborigines had no property rights because they had not laboured
to 'subdue' the land by agricultural cultivation."2 6
Upon
discovery of the high population of indigenous people elsewhere in
Australia-perhaps between 750,000 and 2,000,000 2 7-the
British Empire applied the doctrine of "enlarged terra nullius."
This meant that a colony could be established despite the
presence of a native population, provided such population was
deemed uncivilized or backward. 2 8 For the two hundred years
following Captain Cook's "discovery," colonizing Europeans

20.
The term "Aborigine" or 'Aboriginal" will be used to refer to both
mainland Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
21.
Ann McGrath, A National Story, in CONTESTED GROUND: AUSTRALIAN
ABORIGINES UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN 1, 1 (Ann McGrath ed., 1995).
22.
Bain Attwood, Introduction-The Past as Puture: Aborigines, Australia
and the (Dis~course of History, to IN THE AGE OF MABO: HISTORY, ABORIGINES AND
AUSTRALIA at vii, ix (Bain Attwood ed., 1996).
23.
McGrath, supra note 21, at 12.
24.
See id.
25.
See id.
26.
Id. at 12-13.
27.
See Matthew C. Miller, An Australian Nunavut? A Comparison of Inuit
and Aboriginal Rights Movements in Canada and Australia, EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1175, 1190 (1998). But see Karen E. Bravo, Note, Balancing Indigenous Rights to
Land and the Demands of Economic Development: Lessons from the United States
and Australia, 30 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 529, 550 (1997) (placing the number
of indigenous inhabitants at the time of discovery at 300,000).
28.
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1191 n.101, 1192.
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justified dispossession of indigenous populations based on the
fallacy of "enlarged terra nullius."
For purposes of meaningful advances in Aboriginal land
rights, very little happened during the course of those two
hundred years. However, a few notable events occurred to set the
29
stage for Mabo v. Queensland
and the land rights movements of
the last twenty years. In 1879, the tiny Torres Strait Islands, as
part of the Murray Islands, were annexed and made part of the
Queensland colony.3 0 In 1901, the separate colonies of Australia
were federated into an independent nation. 3 '
In 1967, the
Commonwealth was granted the authority to legislate on behalf of
the Aborigines by a referendum supported by 91 percent of the
voters.3 2
It was in the 1970s, however, that the issue of
Aboriginal land rights finally came to the forefront of political
debate.
Aboriginal gains in land rights issues began with a severe
setback in the courts. In Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (Gove
case),3 3 the Yolngu people brought suit against the government
and a mining company in an attempt to establish ownership of
their traditional lands on the Gove Peninsula in north-east
Arnhem Land.3 4 Justice Blackburn, who decided the Gove case,
set forth a test for establishing native title that included
determining whether the petitioners "maintained the same
linkages with the same areas of land as their ancestors had ...
[in] 1788 at the assertion of British sovereignty."3 5
Based on
cases from other common law countries, Justice Blackburn held
that the common law only recognized individual title to land,
precluding the possibility of community title sought by the
Yolngu.3 6 Finally, the Gove case held that even if native title did

29.
Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
30.
See BRENNAN, supranote 12, at 3.
31.
See id. at xiii, xvii.
32.
Yunupingu, supra note 7, at 5.
33.
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971) 1972-1973 A.A.L.R. 65 (Austl. N.
Terr. S. Ct.).
34.
Id. at81.
35.
BRENNAN, supranote 13, at 5.
36.
Milirrpum (1971) 1972-1973 A.A.L.R. at 176. According to one
commentator, the court's reasoning was based on the idea that "although
indigenous Australians did have a system of land tenure, it could not be
recognized within the current Australian conception of legal title because
indigenous Australians lived in a 'primitive state of society' and as such should
not be entitled to legal ownership of land." Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Comment,
Erosion,of the Indigenous Right to Negotiate in Australia: Proposed Amendments to
the Native Title Act, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 405, 409 (1998). This incompatibility
between aboriginal and common law systems is one of the primary reasons
negotiation is the appropriate forum for resolving the problems of native title. See
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exist, it had been extinguished in 1788 with the declaration of
British sovereignty over Australia.3 7 In short, it was held that
native title did not exist in the common law and that any land
claims by Aborigines must be brought pursuant to rights
conferred by the appropriate legislature. 38
In response to the Gove decision, the Australian government
set the political process in motion. In 1973, the Commonwealth
government established the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission
and appointed Edward Woodward to guide it. 3 9 "The
Commission's terms of reference were not aimed at determining
whether or not land rights should be granted, but how they
should be granted."4°
In its report to Parliament, the
Commission focused on the Northern Territory, not only for
efficiency, but also because the Territory is the one portion of
Australia still directly subject to Commonwealth legislation.
The Commonwealth Parliament responded to these reports
with two legislative enactments. The first of these, the Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975,41 was passed to prohibit any "person
to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction, or
preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any
human right or fundamental freedom."4 2 In 1982, the High Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act, 4 3 which eventually played
a significant role in future land rights decisions. 4 4
The second piece of legislation was the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976. 4 s This enactment provided
Northern Territory Aborigines with a number of significant
advances, including an immediate transfer in ownership of all
land held as reserves, 4 6 establishment of procedures for claiming

infra Part V for a discussion of this and other justifications for favoring negotiation
over litigation in this area.
37.
See Milirrpurn(1971) 1972-1973 A.A.L.R. at 176.
38.
See id. at 154-55.
39.
Woodward, later Justice Woodward, represented the Aborigines in the
Cove case.
40.
Marcia Langton & Nicolas Peterson, Introduction to ABORIGINES, LAND
AND LAND RIGHTS 3, 3 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton eds., 1983) (emphasis
added).
41.
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.).
42.
Id. § 9.
43.
See Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson (1982) 39 A.L.R. 417 (Austl.).
44.
See generally BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 12-13 (discussing the
importance of the Racial Discrimination Act in the Mabo decision.).
45.
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976 (Austl.).
46.
See id. §§ 10-12.
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certain lands outside of town boundaries, 47 giving Aborigines a
nearly irrefutable veto power on all requests for mine
development, 48 and the establishment of representative land
councils using funds from mining on Aboriginal land. 4 9 This Act
has led to the transfer of nearly fifty percent of the Northern
Territory to Aborigines as inalienable freeholds, either through
outright transfers or through the land claims process.5 0 The
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act is commonly
viewed as the high point of legislative recognition of Aboriginal
land rights. 5 '
In 1979, Paul Coe, an Aborigine, filed suit in an attempt to
gain judicial recognition of the existence of native title.5 2
Unfortunately, Coe filed suit on behalf of all Aborigines, claiming
a right to Australia in toto on the theory of native title.5 3 While
the Court dismissed the claim, calling it "absurd and
vexatious, "5 4 some of the Justices also hinted that there may
have been valid legal claims buried in the complaint.5, All that
Coe's claims needed were proper formulation and support, both of
which the court found in Mabo v. Queensland.
B. Mabo v. Queensland
In 1982, Eddie Mabo, along with four other Torres Strait
Islanders, filed suit for native title to the Torres Strait Islands in
the Queensland courts. The Queensland Parliament responded to
the filing by passing the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory
Act of 1985.56 The Act was an attempt to remove the action from
the courts' jurisdiction by declaring that title to the Murray
Islands had vested in the Crown at the time of annexation. The

47.
See id. § 20.
48.
See id. § 40.
49.
See id. § 63(2).
50.
See Gallarwuy Yunupingu, Introduction to OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE, supra
note 1, at xv, xviii.
51.
This is true despite the Commonwealth's passage of the Native Title
Act, 1993. For an example of strong Aboriginal criticism of the Native Title Act,
1993, see Aden Ridgeway, Rights of the First Dispossessed:The New South Wales
Situation, in OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE, supra note 1, at 63.
52.
Coe v. Commonwealth (1979) 24 A.L.R. 118 (Austl.).
53.
See id. at 120-27 (repeating plaintiff's complaint in full).
54.
Id. at 131.
55.
See id. at 137 ("The claim to rights over land or compensation for loss
of such rights is capable of being formulated and presented in an intelligible way."
(opinion of Murphy, J.)).
56.
Because the Act was invalidated in Mabo, it no longer retains a
statutory citation.
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Act also "retroactively validated all dispositions of land.""7 This
legislation, if valid, effectively eliminated the controversy from the
Mabo suit.
For the plaintiffs, the legislation turned out to be the best
thing that the Parliament could have done. The legislation
dismissed the suit, but the Queensland government had created a
constitutional issue that was immediately appealable to the High
The High Court declared the Act violated the Racial
Court.5 s
"This
Discrimination Act of 1975 and was therefore void.5 9

decision assumed, without actually deciding the issue, that the
Islanders' alleged rights existed and were recognized under
Australian common law,"60 and the High Court remanded for
factual findings on the nature of the plaintiffs' title at the time of
61
annexation.
The case returned to the High Court for a final decision in
1992. By a six-to-one majority, the Court overruled Milirrpum,
rejected the doctrine of terra nullius, and acknowledged the
existence of native title in the common law.62 The Court also

rejected the requirements for establishing native title set forth by
Instead, it required only that the
Justice Blackburn. 6 3
community existed at the time of annexation, and that the
connection between the community and the land in question had
not been extinguished. 64 This included extinguishment by state
action. 65 The majority agreed that the Torres Strait Islanders had

57.
Gary D. Meyers & John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian
Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition,23 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1209 (1993).
58.
See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 12.
See Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 83 A.L.R. 14, 33-34 (Austl.).
59.
60.
Meyers & Mugambwa, supra note 57, at 1209.
61.
See id.
62.
According to Justice Brennan, '[t]he fiction by which the rights and
interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as non-existent was
justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this country."
Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1, 28 (Austl.). Justice Brennan also
formulated the rejection of terra nullius as follows:
The common law of this country would perpetuate injustice if it were
continue to embrace the enlarged notion of terra nullius and to persist
characterising the indigenous inhabitants of the Australian colonies
people too low in the scale of social organisation to be acknowledged
possessing rights and interests in land.

to
in
as
as

Id. at 41.
63.
See Meyers & Mugambwa, supranote 57, at 1217-18.
64.
See Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 42-43.
65.
See id. at 42-52. Mabo did not change the two essential methods at a
State's disposal for extinguishing native title. The first method involves granting
land to other persons with the power to exclude traditional owners (i.e., freehold
estates). This includes the kind of governmental reclamation of land that requires
compensation to property holders deprived of title. The other method involves the
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proven their right to the three islands in question6 6based on this
doctrine and ordered the land be returned to them.
Beyond the immediate disposition of the case, however, the
Court did not completely agree on anything. The majority filed
three separate opinions, with the opinion of Justice Brennan
67

generally regarded as the authoritative statement of the law.
The concurring opinions differ over a wide range of issues,
including evidentiary requirements, the right to compensation for
the loss of native title, and the legal rationale for establishing
native title. A majority did agree on the essentials of native title,
which are: "1) title is based on the customary usage by the group
as evidenced by a continuous connection to or use of the land; 2)
title is alienable only to the Crown; and 3) title is qualified by the
Crown's right to limit, regulate, or extinguish it." 6 8 The Crown's
right to extinguish native title was subject to the requirement that
the State or Commonwealth enactment evidence a "clear and
69
plain intention to do so."
The Court also refused to restrict its holding to the specific
facts of the case. Eddie Mabo had originally brought his claim
partly in response to one of the hurdles erected by Justice
Blackburn in the Gove case. Mabo's argument was that Torres
Strait Islanders were different than mainland Aborigines because
The
they could lay claim to plots of land as individuals.7 0
Islanders lived essentially as vegetable gardeners, rather than in
71
the hunter/gatherer communities prevalent on the mainland.
The Court explicitly rejected the mainland/Islander distinction,

government dealing with the land in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
assertion of native title. However, both of these methods are subject to the
restrictions of the Racial Discrimination Act, which require that such grants and
takings not be performed in a discriminatory manner. See BRENNAN, supra note
13, at 17. "The test is always whether or not the third party granted a right or
interest by the Crown has the capacity to exclude traditional owners from their
access and use of land." Id. at 18.
66.
See Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 56.
Justice Brennan's opinion was used as the basis for subsequent
67.
political responses to the Mabo decision, presumably because it was the most
restrictive of the majority opinions. "On most ambiguous questions, the Brennan
judgment can be taken as the minimal exposition of Aboriginal rights enjoying
majority support from the present High Court." See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at
18. Additionally, with Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh concurring with
Justice Brennan, the opinion constitutes a plurality. See Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R.
at 7.
68.
Meyers & Mugambwa, supranote 57, at 1221.
69.
Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 46. In adopting this standard, the Court
followed precedent from Canada and the United States. See Calder v. AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313, 404 (Can.); United States v. Santa
Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941).
See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 9.
70.
See id.
71.

2000]

NEGOTIATION AND NATIVE TITLE

and in the words of Justice Brennan, "there may be other areas of
Australia where native title has not been extinguished and where
an Aboriginal people, maintaining their identity and their
customs, are entitled to enjoy their native title."7 2 The Court also
rejected the theory that the common law could not recognize
communal rights to native title. 73 These decisions potentially
opened the door for land rights claims by mainland Aborigines
whose native lands encompassed vast tracts in Australia.
Because the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions
represent the middle and two extremes of the native title issue,
respectively, it is worth discussing how they disagree. There were
two main points of contention between the Justices. The first
issue involved the role of the State as titleholder to the land in
question. Justice Dawson, as the lone dissenter, agreed with the
State of Queensland's argument that the State held exclusive
right of title to land and that any other title acquired must be
granted by the State on that basis. 74 This included native title.
Although Aboriginal claims preceded the Crown's rights
chronologically, the State's argument required the State to
acknowledge Aboriginal rights to land subsequent to annexation
in order for those rights to become legally binding.75 The majority

72.
Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 50. In response, S.E.K. Hulme, legal
counsel for the Western Australian government during post-Mabo debates, stated:
With no mainland issue, with no evidence as to the mainland, with
no parties concerned with any mainland issue, without argument as to any
mainland issue, the High Court proceeded to destroy what [Justices Deane
and Gaudron] described as "a basis of the real property law of this country
for more than a hundred and fifty years".
S.E.K. Hulme, Aspects of the High Court'sHandling of Mabo, in THE HIGH COURT OF
AUSTRALIA IN MABo 23, 24 (Association of Mining & Exploration Companies, Inc.
ed., 1993).
73.
See Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 36.
"After the Crown has assumed sovereignty and acquired the radical
74.
title to the land, any pre-existing 'title' must be held, if it is held at all, under the
Crown." Id. at 98 (opinion of Dawson, J.).
Justice Dawson stated the argument as follows:
75.
This new title is therefore not merely the continuation of a title previously
held, notwithstanding that it may be identifiable by reference to the
previous title. If the new title is to be held under the Crown, the Crown
must obviously accept it. Such acceptance may be by way of acquiescence
in the continued occupancy of land by the Aboriginal inhabitants, and, if
the native interests are accepted in this manner by the Crown, the nature
of those interests can then only be determined by reference to the nature of
the former occupancy by the aboriginal inhabitants. The appearance
(although not the fact as a matter of law) is, then, that these native
interests continue undisturbed.
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rejected the idea that annexation extinguished native title
rights, 76 although the plurality opinion expressed the view77 that
the sovereign had the power to subsequently wipe them out.
The second issue, regarding an Aboriginal right to
compensation, split the majority. Justices Deane and Gaudron
and Justice Toohey, in separate concurrences, took a much more
sympathetic view to the Aborigines' plight than either the majority
or dissent. Not only did they acknowledge the existence of native
title, they felt it necessary to offer some form of compensation to
those parties who could show that they had been improperly
excluded from their original land, no matter how far back
The plurality
chronologically the exclusion had occurred. 78
refused to discuss the issue because the parties had not placed it
before the court,7 9 while the dissent "assert[ed] that there is no
general rule, either in law or in history, favoring compensation for
loss of native title. "8 0 The disagreement over compensation rights
highlights an area ripe for interpretation not by the courts but by
the parties themselves through some sort of negotiation process.
C. Post-Mabo Politicaland JudicialActivity
Following the High Court's decision in Mabo, both the
political and legal communities responded quickly. The Court
addressed issues involving native title on several subsequent
occasions, most recently in Wik Peoples v. Queensland,8s and has
done little to limit the scope of its holding in Mabo. But even
before the Court affirmed its Mabo ruling, the Commonwealth

76.
According to Justice Brennan, "[the] view that the rights and interests
in land possessed by the inhabitants of a territory when the Crown acquires
sovereignty are lost unless the Crown acts to acknowledge those rights is not in
accord with the weight of authority." Id. at 40.
See id. at 51-52.
77.
78.
"[T]he power of the Crown wrongfully to extinguish the native title by
inconsistent grant will remain but any liability of the Crown to pay compensatory
damages for such wrongful extinguishment will be unaffected." Mabo (1992) 107
A.L.R. at 84 (opinion of Deane & Gaudron, JJ.).
Justice Brennan stated, "Ve are not concerned here with compensation
79.
for expropriation." Id. at 40. However, as one commentator has noted, the
majority judgments all alluded to the Commonwealth Constitution as controlling
the extinguishment of native title. The Constitution's requirement of acquisition
of property on "just terms" arguably leaves some breathing room for future parties
to claim a right to compensation based on past expropriation. See Gordon
Brysland, Rewriting History 2: The Wider Significance of Mabo v. Queensland, 17
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 162, 165 (1992).

80.
81.

Meyers & Mugambwa, supranote 57, at 1230.
Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.).
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government set the political process in motion to establish a
82
compromise.
Recognizing the significance of the Mabo decision, Prime
Minister Keating searched for a method to diminish the potential
impact of the newly recognized theory of native title. However,
because the federal government faced national election in early
1993, its ability to promise and effectuate lasting change was
conditioned on reelection.
Nevertheless, in September 1992,
Keating called for a one-year consultation period that would
involve "discussion among major stakeholders
including
Aborigines, miners, pastoralists and State governments."8 3 On
December
10,
1992,
Keating launched
the
ambitious
International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples," thereby
setting native rights at center stage in the upcoming election.
Following reelection, the Keating government was consumed for
the remainder of 1993 by the native title debate.
October 1993 marked the climax of the ongoing native title
debate. Following months of negotiation, talks broke down on
October 8, a day that came to be known as "Black Friday."8 5 The
main disagreement was over a twenty-one-point list of demands
offered by the Aborigines, which included a demand that the
s6
Federal government not suspend the Racial Discrimination Act
87
in order to validate past titles granted to non-Aboriginal owners.
Without governmental compromise on issues such as this,
Aborigines felt their chances would be better if they just returned
to court.8 8
Fortunately, the government was willing to compromise. The
two sides reached an agreement on Tuesday, October 18, also
known as "Ruby Tuesday."8 9 The basic compromises that led to
the agreement constitute the backbone of the Federal Native Title
Act, 1993,90 which was signed into law December 24, 1993.91
A number of provisions in the Act are worth noting. First,
while Aborigines were able to convince the government not to
suspend the Racial Discrimination Act to validate past grants of

82.
For a more thorough discussion of the political processes involved in
determining native title rights in 1993, see BRENNAN, supranote 13, at 38-80.
83.
Id. at 41.
84.
See U
85.
See id.at 66.
86.
See supranotes 41-44 and the accompanying text.
87.
See BRENNAN, supranote 13, at 66.
88.
See iU at 65.
89.
See &L at 67.
90.
Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.).
91.
See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 79. The Act took effect on January 1,
1994.
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interests in land,9 2 the Act does validate all interests in land
made before November 1, 1975, the date of passage of the Racial
Discrimination Act. 93
However, the Act provides for
compensation to any Aborigines who would have a valid native
title claim but for the grant. 9 4 The Act also provides procedures
to ensure that native title cannot be extinguished without
notifying native titleholders 9 s and involving them in the
appropriate negotiations. 96 As part of these procedures, the Act
established the National Native Title Tribunal, 97 which has
authority to recognize native title rights9" and encourage
mediation of native title claims. 99 Moreover, while Aborigines lost
their potential veto power through the political process, the Act
provides for a right to negotiate with private parties over
development proposals on land subject to native title claims. 100
Many Aborigines feel the Native Title Act, 1993 does not
adequately represent Aboriginal interests in native title.10
Compounding this perception is the current political climate in
Australia, where the Howard Government has passed substantial
curtailment amendments to the Act.102 However, the High Court
continues to be sympathetic to Aboriginal claims, as evidenced by
two landmark cases that followed the passage of the Native Title
Act, 1993.
Before the Commonwealth passed the Native Title Act, 1993,
Western Australia implemented native title legislation of its

92.
Native Title Act, 1993, § 7 (Austl.).
93.
See id. §§ 14-15. The definition of "past act" in the Act sets the date at
January 1, 1994, but the practical effect of the Racial Discrimination Act is to
provide certainty only for those grants issued prior to November 1, 1975. See id.
§§ 228-32 (defining the different types of "past acts").
94.
See id. §§ 17-20.
95.
See id. § 29.
96.
See id. § 31.
97.
See id. § 107.
98.
See id. § 13. However, § 165 states that Tribunal determinations, other
than in relation to a right to negotiate application, "is not binding or conclusive."
Id. § 165. Presumably, this merely allows room for appeal to the Federal Court.
99.
See id. § 72.
100.
See id. § 75.
101. Aboriginal leader Aden Ridgeway wrote:
[N]o other Act in the modem history of this country has had such farreaching consequences-in one fell swoop, all past illegal acts of
government were validated and Aboriginal native title rights were
extinguished. It is a shameful period in the history of this country where
the conception of native title by the High Court in 1992 was quickly
aborted by the Commonwealth Government of the day in 1993.
Ridgeway, supranote 51, at 66.
102. See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 (Austl.).
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The Western Australian scheme replaced Mabo native

title rights with statutory rights that generally were to be
"equivalent in extent to the rights and entitlements that they
replace."10 4 While the Act originally granted Aborigines strictly
non-proprietary interests, 0 s the legislature removed such
language out of fear that the Racial Discrimination Act would
invalidate the legislation.1 0 6 However, the legislation also omitted
any involvement by an independent tribunal for determining
claims.' 0 7 Instead, the Act adopted an administrative structure
designed to ensure continued grants of mining development
leases and to keep administrative decisions regarding native title
away from judicial scrutiny.10 8
With Commonwealth and State legislation in conflict, a
showdown was inevitable. As Western Australia processed and
granted thousands of mining and development applications, the
Western Australia government simultaneously brought suit to
determine the validity of its legislation. The suit culminated in
the High Court's unanimous 1995 decision striking down Western
Australia's Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 1993 and
As a result, all
upholding the Native Title Act, 1993.109
development grants made under the Western Australian
legislation were immediately subject to native title claims, if
110
applicable, leaving developers with title validity concerns.
The second landmark decision of the High Court following
implementation of the Native Title Act, 1993 resolved a question
of national importance dealing with the issue of native title and
pastoral leases."'
The pastoral industry is an uniquely
Australian feature that grew out of ranchers' needs for vast tracts
of land to adequately graze their livestock in the mostly arid
Australian outback.
Currently, forty-two percent of the

103. The Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act, 1993 was invalidated in
the case and is no longer available in statutory form.
104.
BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 105 (quoting original statutory language of
§ 7(2)).
105. These interests preclude the possibility of owning the land using
common law native title.
106.
See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 106.
107.
See icl.at 107.
108.
See id.
109.
See Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 128 A.L.R 1 (Austl.).
110.
See BRENNAN, supranote 13, at 108-09.
111.
For a pre-Wdc analysis of the clash between native title and pastoral
leases, see Henry Reynolds, Native Title and PastoralLeases, in MABO. A JUDICIAL
REVOLUTION-THE ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON AUSTRALIAN
LAW 119 (M.A. Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993) (hereinafter MABO. A
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION).
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Australian mainland is subject to pastoral leases. 1 12 These are
invariably the same lands nomadic Aboriginal bands roamed
before European settlement. Conceivably, many of these lands
may be subject to native title claims under the Mabo standard
and the Native Title Act, 1993, especially considering that neither
legal enactment specifically dealt with this issue.
The High Court dealt with the issue in Wik v. Queensland.113
The Wik and Thayorre peoples are two Aboriginal tribes who
claimed land on Cape York in Queensland under Mabo.1 14 Both
areas claimed were subject to long-standing pastoral lease
1 15
arrangements.
The major issue the High Court grappled with in Wik involved
the nature of pastoral lease grants in general. If the leases were
common law grants of interests in land, the exclusive nature of
such grants precluded any other form of title from coexisting with
them, including native title. 1 16
If, on the other hand, pastoral
leases were statutorily granted, the statute granting them would
1 17
determine the exclusivity of possession or lack thereof.
In a four-to-three decision, the Court held that pastoral
leases
were
statutorily
granted
and
therefore
did not
automatically extinguish native title on lands subject to the
leases. 1 18
Had the Court decided that pastoral leases carried
with them the exclusive possession element of common law
leases, native title would have been extinguished on all land
subject to a pastoral lease. Because of the Court's holding, the
question of extinguishment of native title must now be
119
determined on a case-by-case basis by the courts.
In making its determination, a court must interpret the
statute granting the lease and the terms of the lease agreement.
The court must also determine the extent of native title rights on
the land, if any, and the incidents that accompany such native
title. In the event a court holds native title exists on the land in
question, the question becomes the extent to which the two
interests conflict. When this happens, according to the majority

112. See Peter H. Russell, High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples:
The Limits of JudicialIndependence, 61 SASK. L. REv. 247, 267 (1998).
113. Wik v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.).
114. See id. at 136.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 226 (judgment of Gummow, J.) (The extinguishment of
existing native title readily is seen as a consequence of a grant in fee simple.").
117. See id. at 190 (judgment of Toohey, J.) ("Whether there was
extinguishment can only be determined by reference to such particular rights and
interests as may be asserted and established.").
118. See id. at 189-90 judgment of Toohey, J.).
119. See id.
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in Wik, the native title rights must yield. 120
However, the
implication by the Wik Court on this matter is that yielding is not
the same thing as extinguishment, and that native title survives
the granting of a pastoral
lease and reasserts itself upon the
12 1
conclusion of the lease.
Both the Aboriginal and European communities felt the
Court's decision in Wik was inadequate for resolving the pastoral
lease issue. Aborigines wanted the Court to uphold the validity of
native title claims on land subject to pastoral leases, while
Europeans felt the ad hoc decisionmaking procedure
implemented by the Court involved too much uncertainty.
The political fallout from Wik threatened to eclipse even the
impact of Mabo. The Commonwealth Government's response was
the submission of a Ten Point Plan to Parliament that essentially
extinguished native title on pastoral lease land unless the native
population held current physical access to the land.1 2 2 The Plan
also sought to give the States and Territories the ability to
diminish native title holders' rights to negotiation as granted by
the Native Title Act, 1993.123 The motivations behind the Plan led
to the passage of amendments to the Native Title Act, 1993, in
1998.124
Provisions in the amendments include: blanket
validation of pastoral leases granted between January 1, 1994,
and the date of enactment;1 2 5 removal of the right to negotiate
from, among other areas, compulsory acquisition of native title
rights in a town or city; 126 removal of government obligation to

negotiate in good faith;1 2 7 retention of the physical access test
articulated in the Ten Point Plan; 128 and a list of grants
extinguishing native title, irrespective of the common law, that
includes
freehold grants,
commercial leases,
exclusive

120.
See id. at 190 (judgment ofToohey, J.).
121.
See id. at 275 (judgment of Kirby, J.) (In some cases the grant of such
legal rights will have the inevitable consequence of excluding any competing legal
rights, such as to native title. But in other cases, although the native title may be
impaired, it may not be extinguished.").
122.
See Senator Nick Minchin, Federal Government's Response to the Wik
Decision: The Ten PointPlan (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet ed., 1997)
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.atsic.gov.au/native/10point.htm> (website no
longer available, copy on file with author).
123.
See id.
124.
Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 (Austl.).
125.
See id. § 21.
126.
See id. § 26(2)(iq.
127.
See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Proposed
Amendments to the Native Title Act 1993: Issues for Indigenous Peoples (revised
Oct. 1998) <http://www.atsic.gov.au/> [hereinafter Aboriginal and Torres Strait
IslanderCommission].
128.
See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998, § 44 (Austl.).
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agricultural/pastoral leases, residential leases, and community
12 9
purpose leases.
Actual and potential native titleholders received a few
concessions in the Act.' 3 0 One is the lack of a sunset clause for
bringing native title claims, despite its inclusion in the Ten Point
Plan. This is small consolation, however, because the original
Native Title Act, 1993 did not include a sunset clause either.
Another amendment specifies the application of the Racial
Discrimination Act to the revised Native Title Act and requires any
3l
state legislation to operate in a non-discriminatory manner.1
However, the amendments do not allow native titleholders any
room to challenge the Act as inconsistent with the Racial
32
Discrimination Act.'
Fortunately for native titleholders, there may not be any need
to challenge the Act as inconsistent with the Racial
Discrimination Act. On March 18, 1999, the U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), responding to
an inquiry by the Australian government, called on Australia to
suspend implementation of the Amendments.' 3 3
"CERD
expressed concern over the compatibility of the amended Native
Title Act 1993... with Australia's international obligations under
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
" 13 4
Racial Discrimination (Racial Discrimination Convention).
The Racial Discrimination Convention was implemented in part
through the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and constitutes
directly applicable Australian law. 13 5 As such, the concerns of
the CERD may ultimately prove fatal to the implementation of the
Amendments, which the Australian government will have the
opportunity to defend when it appears before the Commission in
March 2000.136 Should Australia be required or choose to throw
out the Amendments and start over, one of the conditions of
returning to the drawing board will invariably be the inclusion of

129.

See id. § 23B.

130.

See NATIONAL INDIGENOUS WORKING GROUP ON NATivE TITLE, supra note

12 (articulating Aboriginal response to the 10 Point Plan and proposed
Amendments, and suggesting alterations to the Amendments).
131.
Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 § 7.
132.
See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, supra note 127.
133.

See COMMITTEE ON ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCLUDES

FIFrY-FOURTH SESSION, U.N. PRESS RELEASE No. RD/893, Mar. 19, 1999, at 7.
134.
Gillian Triggs, Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law:
Validity of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), 23 MELB. U.L. REv. 372,
373 (1999).
135.
See id. at 376.
136.
Seeid. at374&n.1O.
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aboriginal voices
in the drafting of any changes to the Native Title
7
Act, 1993.13
The end result of native title jurisprudence and legislation in
Australia is the tenuous recognition of native land rights. The
debate over native title is likely to intensify in the next few years
as Australia looks to their celebration of a century of Federation
in 2001 as a reason to rewrite the nation's Constitution.
Regardless of the results of that debate, the result will still likely
fall short of the approach in Canada, which, as will be seen
below, involves constitutional entrenchment of native title
13 8
rights.

IV. CANADA
The long-standing history of Canadian Aboriginal rights
stands in stark contrast to Australia's only recent developments
in recognizing and defining Aboriginal rights. While unable to
resolve all conflicts, historic use of treaties between European
settlers and indigenous populations over much of what is now
Canada has proven an effective means of providing some degree
of certainty to the area of land titles. The Indian, Inuit, and
Metis 1 3 9 populations have been viewed as a part of the Canadian
political and geographical landscape from the time of European
settlement, primarily because of the treaty process. 14 0 As a
result, issues of self-government, and not exclusively land rights,

137. The lack of aboriginal inclusion in the amendment writing process was
one of the main concerns expressed by CERD in its decision. See COMMITTEE ON
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONCLUDES FIFTY-FOURTH SESSION,

supra

note 133, at 7. See also Cappio, supra note 36 (documenting the fundamental
changes in negotiation rights articulated in the Amendments, and arguing for joint
drafting should the Amendments be struck down or voluntarily discarded).
138.
See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text (discussing the
Constitution Act, 1982).
139.
While the term "First Nations" is usually applied when referring to
Canadian Indians, this Note will use the terms "Aboriginal" and "indigenous
populations" when referring to Canadian Aboriginal peoples for two reasons.
First, the terminology is accepted in academic circles and consistent with its
usage in relation to Australian Aborigines throughout this Note. Second, the Inuit
(known in America as Eskimos) and Metis are not usually included under the
'First Nations" heading, even though their Aboriginal rights are constitutionally
guaranteed to the same extent as Canadian Indians. See infra notes 154-65 and
the accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional entrenchment of
Aboriginal rights. Any reference to First Nations in this Note is intended to apply
solely to that group of Canadian Indians who are so classified.
140.
Since the Metis are distinctly separate descendants of the original
inhabitants of Canada, this statement is not entirely true as to them. However,
their inclusion in § 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 indicates a political
importance at least equal to that of the Indian and Inuit populations.
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tend to be at the forefront of Canadian native rights debates.
However, Aboriginal land rights in Canada have returned to both
the forum of public debate and the court room for two reasons.
First, treaties, primarily those of a historical 1 4 ' nature, have
shown interpretational problems for the courts to resolve.
Second, in the areas not covered by treaty-namely most of
British Columbia-indigenous populations are beginning to press
for both land rights and self-government. As the landmark case
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia'42 indicates, these populations

are very willing to go to court to determine their Aboriginal rights.
A. From Sui Generis to the ConstitutionAct, 1982

Aboriginal rights in Canada have developed both through the
use of negotiated treaties and through judicial recognition of
Aboriginal rights in the common law. Regardless of the source of
the rights, however, the interpretation of these rights has been
guided by the understanding that all Aboriginal rights are sui
generis.14 3
Academicians and courts alike emphasize the
uniqueness of Aboriginal rights. 14 4 The logical, and sometimes
unfortunate, results of labeling Aboriginal rights as sui generis
are the interpretive difficulties inherent in applying a body of law
that stands somewhat outside historical precedent.
This
application ultimately leads to difficulties in articulating and
applying comprehensive and consistent tests, as Canadian case
law readily indicates.

141. The term "historical" is derived from the fact that the reinstitution of a
policy of treaty-making in 1973 occurred more than fifty years after the cessation
of such a practice. See Brad W. Morse, A View From the Nortlv Aboriginal and
Treaty Issues in Canada, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 671, 673-75 (1995). The treaties
signed since 1973 tend not to contain the same degree of ambiguity resulting from
differences in understanding of language. As a result, only those treaties that are
properly viewed as "historical" are being subjected to judicial interpretation. See
generally James [sdkdj] Youngblood Henderson, InterpretingSui Generis Treaties,
36 ALTA. L. REV. 46 (1997) (discussing differences in language in Aboriginal and
European cultures that lead to interpretive difficulties, as wel as suggestions for
proper interpretive devices courts should use in resolving these disputes). See
also Bradford W. Morse, Common Roots But Modem Divergences: Aboriginal
Policies in Canada and the United States, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 115, 128 (1997)
(using the term "historical" to refer to treaties signed before World War II).
142. Delgamuukwv. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
143. Sui generis is defined as "of its own kind or class." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999).
144. See, e.g., John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature
of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a Difference?, 36 ALTA. L. REv. 9 (1997) (tracing
the history of Aboriginal rights as sui generis and the application of the sui generis
concept in Canadian courts).
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The seminal modem Aboriginal rights case in Canada is
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia.145 In Calder, the
Nisga'a people (spelled Nishga in the opinion) sought a declaration
of Aboriginal title over their native lands in northwest British
Columbia. 14
While the Nisga'a lost the case in a four-to-three
decision, all six justices who reached the question of Aboriginal
title1 47 recognized its existence in Canadian common law. 148 The
decision turned on whether the Nisga'a claim of Aboriginal title
had been extinguished. Justice Hall, writing for the dissent, first
articulated the "clear and plain intention" test 149 that a majority
of the Court eventually adopted.' 5 0 The Court had no doubt that
the Crown could extinguish native title, but Justice Hall's test
required any act or document purporting to do so evidence a clear
and plain intention that extinguishment was intended.
Calder created a near about-face in political acceptance of
Aboriginal native title. Just four years earlier, the Canadian
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development issued
its Statement of the Government of Canadaon Indian Policy, which
came to be known as "The White Paper."' 5 ' In this paper, the
Trudeau Government expressed its willingness to accept "native
people as individuals to enjoy all the rights and opportunities of
Canadian citizens but repudiated their rights as Aboriginal
peoples."1 5 2 Following Calder, the Government adopted a policy
of negotiation with Aboriginal people where their rights had been
53
neither superseded by law nor extinguished by treaty.1
The culmination of this political turnaround is found in the
constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights in the Canada
Act 1982,154 essentially a redrafting of the Canadian
Constitution. While the Canada Act 1982 consisted of only four
sections, its ambitious purpose was to terminate the power of the

145.

Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313

(Can.).
146.
See id. at 317.
147.
Justice Pigeon dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds. See id. at
426-27.
148.
Because of Justice Pigeon's dismissal on procedural grounds, the
determination of extinguishment resulted in a three-to-three tie.
149.
Calder[1973] S.C.R. at 404.
150.
See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing Guerin v.
The Queen).
151.
The White Paper proposed a number of drastic measures in relation to
indigenous populations, including the termination of treaties, the abolishment of
Indian status, the granting of reserve lands to individual members in fee simple,
and the abolishment of the Indian Department.
152.
Russell, supra note 112, at 260.
153.
See id. at 259.
154.
Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
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British Parliament to legislate for Canada.1 5 5
Section 1 of the
Canada Act 1982 also enacted the Constitution Act, 1982,156
which contains the bulk of the constitutional changes. Section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states: "The existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed." 15 7
Section 35(2) defines "aboriginal
peoples of Canada" as including the Indian, Inuit, and Metis
peoples. 158
While the Act left the interpretation of terms such as
"existing," "recognized," and "affirmed" to future court decisions, a
number of striking elements pertaining to native rights were
noticeable from the time of enactment. Sections 1 through 34 of
the Act comprise the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,'s 9 a collection of rights somewhat analogous to the Bill
of Rights in the U.S. Constitution. Because § 35 falls outside the
Charter, it is not subject to the limitation of § 1, which states,
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society."' 6 0
However, the placement of native
rights in the Act also removes them from the jurisdiction of §
24.161 This section provides standing for anyone whose Charter
rights or freedoms have been infringed to seek a remedy in the
court system. 1 62 Finally, § 25 of the Act protects those Aboriginal
rights recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7,
1763,163 or those acquired through a process of land claims
settlement from abrogation or derogation.164 The end result of
these sections is the first constitutional entrenchment of native
5
rights in a former English colony.16

155. See id. § 2.
156. See id. § 1.
157. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 35(1).
158. Id. § 35(2).
159. Id. pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) §§ 1-34.
160. Id. § 1.
161.
See PETER W. HOGG, CANADA AcT 1982 ANNOTATED 82-83 (1982)
(discussing the rights conferred by § 35 and possible interpretations of the vague
language contained therein).
162. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 24(1).
163. See id. § 25(a). The Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 divided up
British land in Canada and made express grants of land to the various Indian
nations.
The Proclamation also provided other protections for indigenous
populations, including forbidding the taking or purchase of any Indian land.
164. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 25(b).
165. See Russell, supranote 112, at 260.
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B. The Post-ConstitutionAct, 1982 "RollerCoasterRide"
Following the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, both the
political and judicial processes have played integral roles in
defining the scope of Aboriginal rights. While the Supreme Court
has issued a series of cases that one commentator describes as "a
roller coaster ride in its treatment of Aboriginal rights," 166 the
Canadian political machinery has been actively involved in treatymaking and land claims settlements.
Through the political
process, the Canadian Government and the Inuit peoples have
agreed to the creation of Nunavut, a new Territory in Northern
Canada and the largest indigenous land claim settlement in
167
history.
The first major post-Constitution Act, 1982 case dealing with
168
Aboriginal rights came in 1984 with Guerin v. The Queen.
Guerinestablished two broad principles in dealing with Aboriginal
title. First, the Guerin court described Aboriginal title as "a legal
right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and possession
of their tribal lands."1 6 9 Second, the Court articulated a fiduciary
duty owed by the Crown to indigenous populations to protect
their Aboriginal rights. 170 The Court also adopted the term sui
17 1
generis in relation to Aboriginal rights for the first time.
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued its decision in R. v.
Sparrow.172 This case involved a direct conflict between an
asserted Aboriginal right to fish and federal regulatory fishing
legislation.' 7 3 The Court unanimously held that legislation could
limit Aboriginal rights, but only in certain circumstances. In
making its determination, the Court articulated a justificatory
test for abridging or destroying Aboriginal rights similar to the
American constitutional law "compelling interest" test.
The Sparrow justificatory test allows limitation of Aboriginal
rights only when the government has a valid legislative
objective.' 74
The objective must be "compelling and
substantial,"17 5 and the legislation must be "required to

166.
Id. at 270.
167.
See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
168. Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.).
169.
Id. at 376 (citing Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia [1973]
S.C.R. 313).
170.
See id. at 383-88.
171.
See id.at 382.
172.
R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.).
173.
See id. at 1083.
174.
See id.at 1113.
175.
Id.
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accomplish the needed limitation." 176 The Court held that the
objective of "public interest" is overly broad and impermissibly
vague to meet this test,' 7 7 although the Court has since seemed
to undercut this restriction. 17 8 Additionally, the legislation must
be consistent with the fiduciary relationship between the Crown
and the Aboriginal peoples. 17 9 This means that Aboriginal
peoples are entitled to consultation, minimal infringement with
Aboriginal rights in effecting the legislative objective, and, where
appropriate, compensation.18 0 While Sparrow involved Aboriginal
rights conferred by the common law, the Sparrow justificatory
test has since been applied equally to Aboriginal rights created or
affirmed by treaty. 18 1
In 1996, the Supreme Court's "roller coaster ride" took a
downward turn, from the Aboriginal perspective, in the Van der
Peet trilogy. 18 2 In R. v. Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo tribe
was arrested for selling fish caught under a native food fish
license. 18 3 The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's appeal
in a seven-to-two decision. 184 The majority recognized that any
ambiguities in § 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 must be
resolved in favor of Aboriginal peoples. 185 However, to decide
whether an asserted right is protected by § 35(1), the Court
established the "integral to a distinctive culture" test.' 8 6 To meet
the standards of the test, Aboriginal claimants must show that
the practice, custom, or tradition is of "central significance" to the
particular Aboriginal society involved. 1 87 This includes a showing
that the practice, custom, or tradition existed prior to European

176. Id. at 1121.
177. Id. at 1113.
178. See R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, 775 (Can.) (applying the
Sparrow test to apparently sanction "public interest" as a valid legislative
objective).
179. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1114.
180. Id. at 1119.
181. See R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 812-14 (Can.) (applying the
Sparrowjustificatory test to treaties for the first time). For an argument that the
distinction between Aboriginal rights and treaty rights should preclude application
of the Sparrow justificatory test to treaties, see Leonard I. Rotman, Defining
Parameters:Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test, 36
ALTA. L. REV. 149 (1997).
182. R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse
Ltd. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672 (Can.); Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. Due to the similar
issues involved in the three cases, this Note discusses the reasoning in Van der
Peet as representative of the reasoning in N.T.C. Smokehouse and Gladstone.
183.
Van derPeet [1996] 2 S.C.R. at 527.
184. See id. at 525.
185.
See id. at 537.
186. Id. at 549.
187. Id. at 553.
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contact.188 In Van der Peet, the Court held that the sale of fish
was not an integral part of the distinctive Sto:lo culture prior to
contact and was therefore not protected by § 35(l).189
The most recent major Aboriginal rights case to be decided by
the Supreme Court is Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.'90 In
Delgamuukw, two separate Aboriginal peoples, the Gitxsan
(spelled Gitksan in the opinion) and the Wet'suwet'en, claimed
Aboriginal title to approximately 58,000 square kilometers
(22,000 square miles) in northwest British Columbia. 19 1 While
the Court did not definitively decide the merits of the claims, it
reinforced the validity of Aboriginal title. 19 2 Unlike in Australian
jurisprudence, it articulated the restriction that such rights can
93
only be held communally.1
The trial court in Delgamuukw rejected the tribes' oral
evidence of attachment to the land 19 4 that constituted one of the
primary reasons the Supreme Court remanded for a new trial. 195
In making its determination, the Court articulated the test for
proving Aboriginal title. First, the Aboriginal population making
the claim must have occupied the land in question at the time of
the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over the territory. 19 6 Second,
if present occupation of the land is provided as evidence of
occupation at the time of the Crown's assertion of sovereignty, the
Aboriginal population must also show a continuity between the
two times of occupation. 197 Third, the occupation at the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty must have been exclusive.19 8

188.
See id. at 555.
189.
See id. at 571.
190.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
191.
See id. at 1028-29.
192.
See id. at 1080-81.
193.
See id. at 1082. As indicated earlier, Justice Blackburn held in the
Gove case that the common law precluded the possibility of a community
collectively owning land. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. While the
High Court in Mabo overturned this ruling, it retained the possibility of individual
native title to land. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. It is this
possibility of individual native title rights that the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected in Delgamuukw.
194.
See Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1034. Evidence of attachment can
include evidence of use for living or sustenance, spiritual significance, or any
other historical connection to the land in question.
195.
See id. at 1074-76. According to one commentator, the fact that the
case was remanded means "all the Court's reasons on substantive issues, from
aboriginal title to § 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 were technically obiter
dicta." David W. Elliott, Delgamuukw: Back to Court?, 26 MANITOBA L.J. 97, 101

(1998).
196.
197.
198.

See Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1097.
See id. at 1102.
See id. at 1104.
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The political response
to Delgamuukw was one of
19 9
apprehension.
Despite the fact that new treaties were and are
being negotiated in British Columbia, 20 0 much of the province
remains uncovered by treaty agreements. 20 1 The First Nations
Summit, as representative for approximately seventy percent of
British Columbia's Indians, sent a letter to federal and provincial
governments asserting "our aboriginal title to all of B. C. "20 2 One
article compared the effect of Delgamuukw in British Columbia to
the effect of Brown v. Board of Education20 3 in the American
South. 20 4
Underlying
the
political
apprehension
surrounding
Delgamuukw is the potential stabilizing effect of negotiation,
treaty-making, and the political process in general. While the ongoing treaty process in British Columbia was insufficient to keep
the Delgamuukw claims out of court, other negotiation attempts
have been more successful.
The prime example is the creation of a new, Aboriginalgoverned Territory called Nunavut 20 5 over the eastern half of the
current Northwest Territories. 20 6
The Territory was created
following fifteen years of occasionally difficult negotiations
between the government and the Inuit of the Northwest
Territories. 20 7 In exchange for surrendering their land claim, the
Inuit will receive over one billion dollars 20 8 and control of nearly

199.

See Jeffrey Simpson, Editorial, Native-Lands Ruling Has B.C. Nervous,
Mar. 26, 1998, at B5 ("At best, the judgment will force negotiations
leading to new relationships between aborigines and non-aborigines. At worst,
Delgamuukw will unleash fierce political passions, frustrate negotiations, induce
more litigation and tie British Columbia in knots for many years.").
200. See Morse, A View From the North, supra note 141, at 682 ("New
treaties are being negotiated in British Columbia involving 47 separate negotiating
tables representing over 120 First Nations."); see also BC TREATY COMMISSION:
ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 12 (indicating that, as of May 31, 1998, 51 separate
negotiating tables were in various stages of progress); Douglas Sanders, 'We
Intend to Live Here Forever": A Primeron the Nisga'a Treaty, 33 U.B.C.L. REv. 103
(1998) (providing a detailed analysis of the Nisga'a treaty, which conveyed both
aboriginal title and aboriginal self-government rights to an indigenous group in
August, 1998).
201. See Randall Palmer, Canadian Indians Win Historic Decision, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 12, 1997, at 20A.
202. Simpson, supranote 199, at B5.
203. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
204. See Simpson, supra note 199, at B5.
205. Nunavut means "Our Land" in the Inuit language. See Darcy Henton,
A Land the Inuit Can Call Their Own, TORONTO STAR, May 2, 1992, at D1.
206. See Darcy Henton, Cliffhanger Vote Okays Boundaryfor New Territory,
SEATTLE TIMES,

TORONTO STAR, May 6, 1992, at AS.

207. See William Walker, One-Fifthof Canadato Be New Inuit Zone, TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 16, 1991, at Al.
208.
See id.
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two million square kilometers (772,260 square miles) from the
treeline to the North Pole. 20 9 The agreement, which was ratified
by Northwest Territories residents in May 1992, includes
exclusive title to approximately 135,145 square miles and mineral
rights to approximately sixteen percent (21,748 square miles) of
that area.2 1 0 It is easily the largest land claims settlement in the
world. 2 1 1 While initial administrative difficulties threatened to
delay the official separation date of April 1, 1999,212 the
successful negotiation process should provide incentive for
negotiations to take place in other areas of Canada.
Nunavut's success is complemented by the Canadian
government's express willingness to negotiate not just aboriginal
title claims but the more important claims involving aboriginal
self-government.
In its official policy guide on the matter of
aboriginal self-government,2 1 3 the Canadian government has
stated:
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of selfgovernment as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982....
The Government acknowledges that the inherent right of selfgovernment may be enforceable through the courts and that there
are different views about the nature, scope and content of the
inherent right. However, litigation over the inherent right would be
lengthy, costly and would tend to foster conflict. In any case, the
courts are likely to provide general guidance to the parties involved,
2 14
leaving it to them to work out detailed arrangements.

For these reasons, the Government is convinced that litigation
should be a last resort. Negotiations among governments and
Aboriginal peoples are clearly preferable as the most practical and
effective way to implement the inherent right of self215
government.

209.
210.
211.

See Henton, Cliffhanger Votes Okays Boundary, supra note 205, at AS.
See id. at AS.
See Galen Rowell, The Last Frontier,HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 22, 1998,

at Travel 1.
212.
See Darcy Henton, Inuit's Dream of Home Rule Coming True . .. But
Slowly, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 5, 1998, at A7.
213. FEDERAL POLICY GUIDE, ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: THE GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA'S APPROACH

TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

INHERENT

RIGHT AND

THE

NEGOTIATION OF ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (published under the authority of
the Honorable Ronald A. Irwin, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, 1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL POLICY GUIDE].
214.
Id. at 3.
215.
See id.
The FEDERAL POLICY GUIDE also indicates the Canadian
Government's willingness to constitutionally protect any land settlements reached
through the treaty-making process. See id. at 8.
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This express willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations
will almost certainly provide incentive for Aboriginal populations
to resolve their disputes over the bargaining table.

V. LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
NEGOTIATION INSTEAD OF LITIGATION

The advantages of negotiation over litigation are numerous.
While many of these advantages may be viewed as arguments
advocating negotiation in any situation, they are of particular
importance in the area of native rights. This section will utilize
specific examples from the political and legal processes involved
in native rights in Australia and Canada to emphasize this
importance.
Two classifications are necessary to determine the potential
impact of a negotiation process on indigenous populations' land
rights. First, the legal reasons involve inherent functions and
restrictions of the common law court system that make it illequipped to deal with this particular issue. This Note stresses
the common law court system for three reasons: (1) the most
visible native rights movements are currently found in Canada
and Australia, both common law countries, (2) the common law's
reliance on precedent combined with the recent court victories for
native rights make these jurisdictions particularly ripe for
extended litigation in this area, and (3) the practical necessity of
focusing on a small number of jurisdictions as representative of
the problem as a whole.
Second, while the legal impact of negotiation is the primary
focus of this Note, the extralegal justifications for employing
negotiation are of profound importance for those parties who will
be involved in the process. These reasons emphasize the
incompatibility of native and European-based legal structures,
the restrictions on indigenous populations that could keep them
from adequately presenting their case to the courts, and, once
again, the inherent restrictions of the common law court system
that make it ill-equipped to deal with native rights.
A. Legal Justifications

1. Structure and Nature of the Common Law Court System
Common law courts, by their nature, have fundamental
structural characteristics that are inadequate for meeting the
challenges of native land rights issues. Common law courts can
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only decide those disputes and issues brought before them. As a
result, there will always be necessary ancillary issues that the
courts will need to discuss in order to decide specific questions
such as who owns what land. However, the courts are forbidden
to actually render judgment on these points, unless they were
redressable issues put forward by the parties involved. Asking a
court to essentially determine the structure of all future
relationships between Aboriginal and European descendants,
which is ultimately what is required to resolve these issues, is
neither an appropriate use of the court system's time nor a
practical possibility from the view of the parties involved. This is
a practical impossibility because of the requirement on common
law courts to only address those issues that are properly brought
before them. The procedural and pleading requirements inherent
in the common law are designed to promote certainty, not
flexibility. Given the length of most native title negotiations and
the amount of compromise that is inevitably required, flexibility in
the process appears to be a necessity for resolving any issues that
go beyond the granting of land rights to one party versus another.
The inflexibility of the common law court system is therefore the
exact opposite to what is required to achieve an appropriate
solution. 2 16 Common law courts are not a part of the political
process for good reasons, yet they must always be aware of the
potential political impact of their decisions and be prepared to
2 17
deal in dicta with possible solutions to these ancillary issues.
While the common law court system tends to regard itself as
capable of handling any issue, no matter how complex,
determining the entire scope of the rights and responsibilities of
two separate cultures may be beyond its capacity. Professor
Elliott has stated:
In some areas addressed in Delgamuukw, such as aboriginal selfgovernment, we may be reaching the limits of judicial effectiveness.
Ultimately, the law of aboriginal rights and title is a highly
discretionary balancing act between aboriginal and non-aboriginal
interests. Beyond a point, greater judicial involvement produces
not less but greater uncertainty, and greater uncertainty leads to
2 18
more litigation.

216.

"ITIhere are limits to what courts can do with aboriginal rights. Claims

derived from life hundreds of years ago, in very different societies, are not good
material for the adversarial trial process." Elliott, supra note 195, at 131.
217. For an argument that the Australian High Court stepped outside its
constitutional role into the political arena in deciding Mabo, see Gabriel A. Moens,
Mabo and Political Policy-Making by the High Court, in MABo. A JUDICIAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 111, at 48.
218.
Elliott, supranote 195, at 131. Implicit in Professor Elliott's statement
is the idea that 'discretionary balancing" is a political activity, not a judicial one.
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For this reason, tribunals and a series of negotiations may be the
only logical way to proceed in deciding these issues. If, through

the course of negotiation, the parties are still unable to agree, the
judicial process remains a viable alternative. However, the courts
should always be a last resort when such multifaceted issues
involving broad public policy implications are in dispute.
As a structural and practical matter, once the court decides
an issue, it is unlikely that the parties would go back and start
the process over. Due to the adversarial nature of common law
court proceedings, the winning side is usually satisfied with the
decision and has no incentive to then return to the bargaining
table to determine an outcome that is more equitable to both
sides. As stated by Professor Kent McNeil:
[W]hat incentive is there for governments to reach agreements
which give effect to "the aspirations of the aboriginal peoples" after
the courts have reduced the already limited bargaining power of
those peoples by embracing a narrow definition of their Aboriginal
rights? Court decisions can have a powerful influence on the
positions governments adopt at the bargaining table. Moreover,
public support for negotiated agreements can also be influenced by
2 19
judicial pronouncements on the nature of Aboriginal rights.

On the other hand, if the negotiation process fails, the courts are
always available as a last resort.

Additionally,

because

negotiations

of

this

magnitude

inevitably require involvement by the state or federal government,
going to court first will almost certainly preclude this necessary
inclusion. Again, the party who "won" in court will have no
reason to then negotiate, and the Government is justifiably
hesitant to interfere in the matter once the courts have made
their decision.
Due to the ongoing nature of this problem, the more that can
be resolved outside the courtroom, the greater the possibility that
all issues will eventually be addressed and resolved.
Court
involvement may be beneficial and even inevitable at certain
stages of the process. However, the odds of arriving at a swift and
equitable resolution are better if such involvement is limited to
those issues that absolutely require it.
Finally, the cost and time involved in bringing claims such as
these to court are generally more than either party can bear. "It
has been estimated that the Government has spent millions and
millions of dollars in unsuccessful legal challenges.... This has

219.

Kent McNeil, The Meaning of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY

RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, EQUITY, AND REsPEcT FOR DIFFERENCE 135, 152

(Michael Asch ed., 1997) (quoting Judge Macfarlane from the British Columbia
Court of Appeals opinion in Delgamuukw) (footnotes omitted).
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contributed to what has been a painfully slow process." 2 20 In
particular, indigenous populations are generally hampered by a
lack of financial resources to conduct extended litigation
proceedings. However, they may collectively be willing to wait to
acquire rights to land when those rights have been denied them
for over two hundred years. 2 2 1 Current landowners, on the other
hand, may very well have the financial resources necessary to
bring the suit to court, but the uncertainty of the outcome may
restrict them from utilizing the land to its full potential during the
course of the proceedings. 2 2 2 For example, the filing of the Wik
claim to land, "even if it did not succeed . . . caus[ed] such
uncertainty in the market as to place at risk a planned $1.75
billion expansion of the mining and smelting operation [of
Comalco] in Queensland." 2 2 3 Based on the extended nature of
both Mabo and Delgamuukw, 22 4 these periods of economic
stagnation could have a potentially devastating effect on the
landowners.
Negotiation has the potential to utilize the parties' time more
effectively. One long negotiation session can resolve a great deal
of all potential conflicts, whereas all one case can do is help to
eliminate a small amount of adverse legal precedent. 2 25 Courts
may be the final arbiters of the law, but individuals in cooperation
can still provide the structure of societies.
Based on these
arguments, in terms of time and money, both sides would be
better off to negotiate.

220. Yunupingu, supranote 7, at 10.
221.
See BRENNAN, supra note 13, at 65 ("[Aborigines] would be far more
patient enduring the uncertainty of unregistered titles than would big business,
foreign investors or the State governments wanting access to their lands.")
Despite this collective patience, individual claimants will inevitably find such a
process unduly frustrating. As Galarrwuy Yunupingu stated, "[miany claimants
have died, heartbroken, after waiting more than a decade for the outcome of their
land claim." Yunupingu, supra note 7, at 10.
222. Usually, private individuals' funds were not on the line at all.
'Hundreds of thousands, almost undoubtedly, millions of dollars of public funds,
taxpayers' money, was used to try to stop peoples' legitimate claims to their land."
David Ross, Future Directions-ItsAbout Rightsl, in OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE, supra
note 1, at 125, 127.
223.
BRENNAN, supranote 13, at 26.
224.
For example, both Mabo and Delgamuukw involved ten years of
litigation, and Delgamuukw still has the possibility of returning to court.
225.
See Ross, supra note 222, at 133 ("IWe will not agree to relinquishour
rights....
If forced to, we will fight for them. That presents the prospect of
arguing it out in the courts for the next 20 or 30 years, cobbling together a picture
of indigenous rights through a series of disjointed legal decisions." (emphasis in

original)).

460

VANDERBILT JOUNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:427

2. Devastating Potential Impact
It should be obvious that the amount of land now up for
grabs because of recent court decisions could have a potentially
devastating impact on the geography and economies of both
Canada and Australia. Shortly after the Mabo decision, one
commentator estimated that as much as ten percent of Australian
land, most of it in Western Australia, was open to native land
rights claims.2 2 6 While a land rights case makes its way through
the court system, title to the land is in doubt, and only one party
can "win" the rights to the land when the case is decided.
Part of the proper role of the courts is to decide issues
brought before it in favor of one of the parties. On the other
hand, the express purpose of negotiation is to arrive at an
amicable solution agreeable, or at least tolerable, to all parties
involved. During the course of a negotiation process, current
landholders can rest assured that the intent of the process is not
to completely divest them of their land but rather to come to a
compromise that factors in their input. The participants of a
negotiation process can also be assured that the decision arrived
at is binding on both parties. As stated by a leading Aboriginal
activist:
As everyone knows, mining is a risky business. A lot of holes are
dug, and they don't always find something. We can't help them
with that. Where we can help, however, is that through the land
rights process if we reach an agreement, then the company knows
227
that the terms of the agreement are certain and binding.

Losing some land through a bargaining process is better than the
possibility of losing all of it through judicial decree.
Additionally, now that aboriginal or native title rights have
been recognized in the court systems of both Canada and
Australia, the more difficult questions of the nature and extent of
aboriginal self-government await resolution. Taking these issues
to the courts will result in the same uncertainty over the same
lands for perhaps even longer than the initial round of cases that
established aboriginal or native title rights in the first place.
According to one commentator, should courts continue to tackle
the increasingly complex aboriginal self-government issue, the
result "could well be economic paralysis, judicial backlogs,

226.
Meyers & Mugambwa, supra note 57, at 1205-06 (citing Deanie Carbon
& Peter Wilson, lOpc of Land Up for Mabo Claims, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 5-6,
1992, at 1).
227. Yunupingu, supra note 7, at 11.
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deterioration in aboriginal and non-aboriginal
2 28
relations, and yet more legal uncertainty."

community

B. Extralegal Justifications

1. Negotiation as an Equal Forum in Practice and Perception
While the common law court system is the primary
adjudicator of rights in those jurisdictions that utilize it, it is
certainly not the sole means of achieving just ends. Negotiation is
an equally viable alternative to the litigation process. 2 2 9 In some
ways, and particularly for some issues, it is even fairer than
litigation because it provides the contesting parties with
potentially neutral ground on which to bargain.
A number of reasons emphasize at least the potential for a
negotiation process that is more fair than trial by a court. First,
there are no preexisting guidelines in a negotiation process. The
participants are free to agree on an objective and employ
whatever means they see fit to meet it. In the indigenous land
rights area, this is important because the process will then match
the current state of the issue. Because the theory of native title
has only recently gained recognition in the common law legal
tradition, a large amount of creative problem-solving will be
necessary to both understand and integrate solutions to native
title problems into the common law. The participants in a case
such as this will be better served to employ a process that is
conducive to a free exchange of ideas, rather than one that
involves hundreds of years of restrictive procedural requirements.
These requirements are necessary and effective in cases involving
fine-tuning of existing law.
However, they are decidedly
ineffective when it comes to creating completely new areas of law.
Along with the hundreds of years of restrictive procedural
requirements come an equal number of precedent rulings. 2 30 In
general, these rulings favor the European view of native rights to

228.
Elliott, supra note 195, at 129. In the same article, Professor Elliott
stated, "In light of [the] potential consequences... courts may find it necessary to
defer final rulings on injunctions or compensation until governments and
claimants have had an opportunity to settle matters through negotiation." Id.
229.
For a description of one negotiation session involving native title that
appears to have been a success, see John Ah Kit, Land Rights at Work-Aboriginal
People and Regional Economies, in OUR LAND IS OUR LIFE, supra note 1, at 52, 56-

57.
230. The effect of precedent, particularly in emerging legal fields, may not be
that strong in Australia because of its decision to remove itself completely from
the English legal tradition. See Australia Act, 1986, ch. 2 (Eng.).
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land. As discussed in prior sections, it is only in the last few
decades that the momentum has begun to swing the other way.
It is this shift in the balance that should tell both sides of the
conflict that now is the time to negotiate. European descendants
should have incentive to negotiate because they can no longer
comfortably rely on favorable precedents. On the other hand,
indigenous populations have the law somewhat on their side for
the first time, but the inherent volatility of the native title issue
indicates that they too would be best served by stable,
comprehensive, and legally enforceable negotiated settlements.
Inevitably, no matter how favorable native positions are viewed by
the courts, some indigenous claim to land will be rejected, and
the momentum will almost certainly swing the other way. The
optimal time for resolution is when both sides are equally unsure
of their stability. 2 3 ' Given the current legal and political climate,

that time is now.
Finally, negotiation may be fairer in practice than litigation
because it has the potential to remove the issues from an
adversarial process. The parties involved are free to choose any
method they see fit to meet the problem at hand. While this
choice could be for an adversarial negotiation process, many
parties agree to negotiation for the purpose of avoiding the
adversarial nature of the court system. In an issue such as
native land rights, lawyers will almost certainly be a necessary
component of the negotiation process. However, just because
lawyers are involved does not lead to the conclusion that their
role must be an adversarial one.
Their role should more
appropriately be that of reference, to provide insight into possible
legal ramifications of proposed courses of action. Other than
providing a sounding board for feasibility, the involvement of
lawyers should be kept to a minimum to allow the parties to
arrive at solutions and suppress opportunities for lawyer
advocacy.

231. The role that international law is playing in this area, while almost
entirely outside the scope of this Note, cannot be overstated. The growing
importance of racial and social justice generally, and aboriginal rights specifically,
is reflected in, for example, the expanding body of U.N. documents devoted to
preserving racial and social equality. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III).A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Seas., Resol. Pt.
1, 183 mtg., at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Agreements such as these indicate a
general trend toward protection of aboriginal interests that stands in opposition to
common law precedent. The opposing poles of international public policy and
stare decisis strengthen the possibility of instability in judicial decisions.
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In the area of native land rights, the perception that the
negotiation process is fair may be even more important than the
fact that it truly is fair, particularly to the indigenous populations
who will participate. In their view, the parties will meet on equal
footing, perhaps for the first time in history. 23 2 For a population
that has been viewed from both sides of the equation as standing
somewhere outside the political and legal process, the very fact of
inclusion may be seen as a step in the fight direction. Indigenous
populations seem to be striving not only for their land, but also
for recognition of their way of life. They are searching for an
identity that fits within the system, as opposed to one that
constantly occupies the fringe.
What this issue deals with is not just opposing viewpoints
but potentially irreconcilable cultural worldviews. In Mabo, the
High Court rejected the previously upheld assertion that native
title fights were "limited to interests which were analogous to
common law concepts of estates in land or proprietary rights, [or
were] ... determined by reference to European legal usages alien
to native societies." 23 3 Native cultures have abided by European
legal standards because they had no other choice. 23 4 Indigenous
populations may understandably view the court system as a
forum to which they have repeatedly been invited and in which
they have almost consistently suffered losses. While cases like
Mabo and Delgamuukw may indicate a reversal of this trend, it
may take many more favorable decisions before indigenous people
feel truly comfortable taking their cases to court. 23 5

232.
"[T]he recognition of native title has allowed Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples to come to the negotiating table with legally recognised
traditional rights to land and resources for the first time in the recent 200-year
history of this country." Ridgeway, supranote 51, at 65.
233.
Meyers & Mugambwa, supra note 57, at 1217-18. As Justice Toohey
stated in the Mabo decision, "it would defeat the purpose of recognition and
protection if only those existing rights and duties which were the same as, or
which approximated to, those under English law could comprise traditional title."
Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1, 146 (Austl.) (opinion of Toohey, J.). This
statement stands in direct contrast to Justice Blackburn's application of
European common law notions of property in the Cove case. See Milirrpum v.
Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971) 1972-1973 A.L.R. 65 (Austl.).
234.
"We have suffered the consistent invalidation and devaluation of our
world view and experience. The arrogance of presuming that one world view is
more valid than another can only be maintained by the force of the law of the
state. The force of one legal system denying another." Dodson, supra note 1, at
42.
235. Justice Brennan succinctly summarized 200 years of common law
treatment of indigenous populations in Mabo:
[T]he common law itself took from indigenous inhabitants any right to
occupy their traditional land, exposed them to deprivation of the religious,
cultural and economic sustenance which the land provides, vested the
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Courts Are Not the Proper Forum for Moral Issues

The entire issue of native rights to land involves not only a
shift in the legal structure but also an implicit reparation for
hundreds of years of moral wrongs. Australia's Native Title Act,
1993 acknowledges this when it states that one of the purposes of
the Act should be to "rectify the consequences of past
injustices."23 6 Common law courts are not designed to deal with
moral or political problems. They are structured in such a way as
to avoid influence by the political whims of the present. Some of
the safeguards imposed to insure insulation from politics include
life tenure for federal justices, multiple seats in the highest court
of the land, and the requisite background in law.
Legislatures represent society as a whole, including current
moral and political views, and it is through some form of
legislative process that these issues must ultimately be
resolved. 23 7
The creation of Nunavut in Canada is a prime
example of the results that this sort of process can reach.
Whether one views legislation as a necessary component of the
negotiation process or negotiation as a necessary component of
the legislative process is irrelevant. Neither will achieve results
without the parties first agreeing to meet on neutral terms in an
attempt to arrive at an amicable solution.
Justice Brennan, in the plurality opinion in Mabo, made two
statements that highlight the difficulty courts face in subjecting
moral values to judicial standards. In articulating the need for
greater judicial activism, Justice Brennan stated that, "it is
imperative in today's world that the common law should neither
23 8
be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination."
However, Justice Brennan also recognized the need for common
law courts to maintain their objectivity and conform their

land effectively in the control of the Imperial authorities without any right
to compensation and made the indigenous inhabitants intruders in their
own homes and mendicants for a place to live.
Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 18.
236. Native Title Act, 1993, preamble (AustI.).
237. Unfortunately, the parties involved in an extended negotiation process
always run the risk that the very political whims courts are designed to avoid may
ultimately be the downfall of the process.
In response to the Howard
Government's attempts to restrict the application of the Native Title Act, 1993,
David Ross wrote, "[i]n 1993 we made an agreement with Government in good
faith and as far as we're concerned, a change in the political colour of Government
should make no substantial difference to the validity of the agreement which was
made with us as indigenous peoples with unique rights in land." Ross, supra note
222, at 131.
238. Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R. at 28.
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decisions with existing rules of law: "T]his Court is not free to
adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and
human rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of
principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal
23 9
consistency."
Professor Gabriel Moens argued that while the Court's
actions in Mabo did not "fracture" Brennan's "skeleton of
principle," the Court's reasoning "may have profound negative
implications for the constitutional position of the judiciary and,
24°
indeed, for the administration of the law of the land."
Professor Moens expressed two concerns:
Firstly, in my view, the majority departed from the traditional
common law approach of responding cautiously to changes in
community values and attitudes. In overturning long standing
precedents, the majority acted on insufficient evidence of current
community attitudes to the problem at hand, taking their cues from
international treaties ratified or accepted by Australia's political
leaders. Secondly, in reversing longstanding precedents, the Court
retrospectively altered legal relations established by those
precedents, thereby potentially defeating legitimate expectations
241
founded on them.

These concerns retain validity anytime the courts take on what is
essentially a moral issue.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Common law courts have dealt with Aboriginal or native title
claims in as fair a manner as they would any other legal issue.
However, in both Australia and Canada, the judgments of the
courts have emphasized the uniqueness of Aboriginal claims to
land. It is this uniqueness that causes the courts no small degree
2 42
of consternation in attempting to deal with this issue.
At various times, both the parties involved and the courts
themselves have articulated the need to negotiate, rather than
litigate, Aboriginal claims to land. Following the Delgamuukw
decision, one of the Gitxsan chiefs stated, "We're quite happy with
the decision and hopefully we can work together from now on,
instead of going to the court."2 4 On the other hand, even when

239.
240.
241.
242.
six-to-one
at 1.
243.

Id. at 18.
Moens, supranote 217, at 50.
Id.
For example, the High Court in Mabo wrote four separate opinions in a
decision articulating the validity of native title. Mabo (1992) 107 A.L.R.
Palmer, supra note 201, at 20A (quoting Gitxsan chief George Muldoe).
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the parties employ negotiation, the results are not always
favorable to all who are or could potentially be involved.
Following the creation of Nunavut, many Dene Indians in the
Northwest Territories strongly opposed the western boundary line
because they felt it incorporated traditional Dene lands into
government-approved Inuit territory. 24 4 This points out that the
settlement of one land claim invariably precludes the possibility of
another Aboriginal population attempting to prove title to the
2 45
same lands.
To their credit, both the Australian and Canadian
governments have emphasized the need for negotiation in this
area. The Australian government included the right to negotiate
in the Native Title Act 1993.246 As indicated earlier, 2 4 7 while the
1998 Amendments removed this right, the United Nations has
since declared the Amendments discriminatory and violative of
the Racial Discrimination Convention, of which Australia is a
248
party.
One of the strongest arguments for negotiation was made by
the majority judgment in Delgamuukw. After remanding for a
new trial, the author of the majority opinion stated the following
in dicta:
Finally, this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only
in economic but in human terms as well. By ordering a new trial, I
do not necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to litigation and
to settle their dispute through the courts. As was said in Sparrow,
s. 35 (1) "provides a solid constitutional base upon which
subsequent negotiations can take place".
Those negotiations
should also include other aboriginal nations which have a stake in
the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not
a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good
faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good
faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of
this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van derPeet to be a
basic purpose of s. 35(1)-the reconciliation of the pre-existence of

244.

See Henton, A Land the Inuit Can Call Their Own, supra note 205, at

Dl.
245. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1123
(Can.) (articulating the need for any Aboriginal populations whose rights may be
affected by a suit for land rights to intervene or be joined in the proceedings to
provide proper closure and certainty for all involved).
246. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Native
Title Act).
247. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (discussing validity of
Native Title Amendment Act in view of international law).
248.
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supranote 231.
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the aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown." Let us
2 49
face it, we are all here to stay.

This raises the ultimate question-if everyone agrees these
issues should be negotiated, why are they still going to court?
Geoffrey Robert Schiveley*

249. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1123-24 (citations and internal crossreferences omitted).
* I would like to thank my wife, Amy, for her undying patience, love, and
support, my family, Mark, Tudy, Steve, and Gregg, for having this bad habit of
always forcing me to think, and the Joumal Staff and Editorial Board, for showing
yet again how much time and energy it takes to do this job as well as they do.
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